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CBackground: Until recently, purchasers’ options regarding whether to
pay for the use of medical technologies have been binary in nature: a
treatment is either covered or not. Policies, however, have emerged
that expand the decision options, for example, linking coverage to
evidence development, an option increasingly used for treatments
with limited/uncertain evidence. There has been little effort to recon-
cile the features of technologies with the available decision options.
Methods: We described a framework within which different decision
options can be evaluated. We distinguished two sources of value in
terms of health: the value of the technology per se and the value of
reducing decision uncertainty. The costs of reversing decisions were
also considered. Findings: Purchasers should weigh the expected ben-
efits of coverage against the possibility that the decision may need to be
reversed and the chance that adoption will hinder evidence generation.
Based on the purchaser’s range of authority over access, research, and O
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oi:10.1016/j.jval.2011.12.013rice and on the characteristics of the technology with regard to revers-
bility and evidence, different decisions may be appropriate. The
ramework clarified the assessments needed to establish the appropri-
teness of different decisions. A taxonomy of coverage decisions was
uggested. Conclusions: A range of decision options may facilitate
aying for the use of promising medical technologies despite their un-
ertain evidence. It is important that the option be chosen on the basis
f not only the expected value of a technology but also the value of
urther research, the anticipated effect of coverage on further research,
nd the costs associated with reversing the decision.
eywords: cost-effectiveness, coverage with evidence development,
ealth technology assessment, only in research, patient access
cheme.
opyright © 2012, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Historically, new health care technologies such as pharmaceuti-
cals and devices gained access to health care systems and cover-
age directly following regulatory approval or licensing. Many
health systems, however, in an effort to stem rising health care
costs now require a higher standard: that the expected additional
health benefits of a new technology justify its additional cost [1].
This has changed the type and quantity of evidence required be-
fore technologies are made available for widespread use. Even in
systems that do not explicitly consider cost, there is often a focus
on the magnitude of health benefits, which are informally
weighed against cost. For example, evidence suggests that Medi-
care in the United States does not automatically cover new, more
costly medical technologies without consideration of the magni-
tude of their incremental health benefits [2,3].
In most systems, therefore, purchasers (or “reimbursement au-
thorities”) are increasingly balancing the potential for improved
health outcomes offered by new technologies against acquisition
costs. This challenge is accentuated by the fact that such decisions
have to be made earlier, often shortly following regulatory ap-
proval, partly as a result of pressure from patients, manufacturers,
and other stakeholders [4–8]. The evidence available at a product’s
* Address correspondence to: Simon Walker, Centre for Health Ec
E-mail: simon.walker@york.ac.uk.
098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2012, Internation
ublished by Elsevier Inc.aunch, however, is largely focused on regulator’s needs rather
han the decisions of purchasers. Although many new technolo-
ies appear promising on the basis of this evidence, there is typi-
ally little information on relative effectiveness in routine use or
gainst existing interventions, let alone about relative cost-effec-
iveness, and so there is often considerable uncertainty about the
onsequences of their widespread use.
Until recently, the decisions of purchasers in many health sys-
ems have been considered largely binary in nature: on the basis of
he price set by the manufacturer and the evidence available at
aunch, the purchaser decides whether or not to pay for the prod-
ct, for the entire indication, or for a particular subgroup. New
ecision options, however, have emerged. Examples include cov-
rage only with research (OWR) [9–11], only in research (OIR) [12],
nd with performance-linked payments, sometimes referred to as
risk sharing” [13,14]. These options have been developed with the
bjective of allowing patients early access to promising health
are technologies, giving manufacturers longer to make returns
efore patent expiration, and reducing the risks purchasers face in
aking wrong decisions and allowing them to obtain more evi-
ence. Purchasers, however, have different ranges of authority
ver access, research, and price. Thus, some are more limited than
thers in the types of coverage decision that they can consider.
ics, University of York, York YO10 5DD, UK.
ciety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
571V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 7 0 – 5 7 9This article sets out a conceptual framework allowing the
wider set of decision options available to purchasers to be under-
stood. It identifies the essential contribution that each option
makes and the key assessments purchasers should make to estab-
lish which is the most appropriate. We show that the appropri-
ateness of a decision depends on the combination of several
circumstances, including the features of the particular technol-
ogy and purchaser’s range of authority. Finally, we present a
taxonomy of the options available to purchasers and a classifi-
cation of schemes observed in practice, and we discuss impli-
cations for policy and the impact of widening the range of au-
thority granted to purchasers.
Conceptual Framework
The appropriate purchasing decision regarding a new technology
depends on the assessment of three essential features: 1) the ex-
pected value of the technology based on existing evidence, 2) the
value of reducing uncertainty about the technology’s value by ac-
quiring more evidence, and 3) the value of any investment or re-
versal costs resulting from an initial positive coverage decision.
These are briefly considered in turn below and with more detail
provided elsewhere [15,16].
The value of a technology
A technology can be considered valuable if its expected additional
health benefits justify its additional net costs. In a budget-con-
strained, or “closed,” health care system such as UK’s National
Health Service (NHS), funding a more expensive new technology
requires other health activities to be curtailed to accommodate the
additional costs, leading to forgone health outcomes elsewhere
that are incurred as “opportunity costs.” In such a system, a tech-
nology is valuable if the expected health benefits to those who will
use that technology exceed the health benefits expected to be for-
gone by other patients whose care will be displaced [17]. The same
principle applies to open health systems such as those in the
United States, but in the absence of firm budget constraints on
health, the opportunity costs may manifest themselves in terms of
forgone non health expenditure through increased insurance pre-
miums, taxation, or co-payments. For the rest of this article, we
focus on the perspective of a closed system; however, it readily
generalizes to open systems with the opportunity cost falling on
non health expenditure rather than health.
The price of the new technology clearly plays a key role in
determining whether a new technology is expected to be of value.
The higher the price, the greater the health care costs and hence
the larger the opportunity costs in terms of displaced health. The
health benefits of the new technology less the health forgone to
fund it is referred to as the net health benefit (NHB). If a technology
is expected to have a negative NHB, a reduction in the price will
lower the additional health care costs and may result in the ben-
efits exceeding the costs, and a positive NHB.
The value of evidence
When assessing the value of a new technology, gaps in evidence
may mean that the estimates of the expected costs, health out-
comes, and, therefore, overall NHB will be uncertain. Additional
evidence can reduce this uncertainty, reducing the risk of incor-
rect decisions (i.e., coverage of a technology that does not actu-
ally provide a positive NHB). It has been demonstrated that ev-
idence that reduces uncertainty is valuable for the same
reasons as access to a new and effective technology: it can im-
prove population health [18]. Therefore, some assessment of
uncertainty, its consequences, and the need for further re-
search is required by purchasers. Such assessment of uncer-tainty can be informed through well-established quantitative
methods, which can be extended to consider the value of pro-
posed research designs [19,20].
The generation of additional evidence may, however, be
costly, both in resources needed to do the research and in delays
in approving a valuable technology for widespread use. Ideally,
a promising technology that is expected to be of value would be
paid for while further research is being conducted to resolve
uncertainties. Allowing patients early access to the technology,
however, may reduce the likelihood of the required research
being conducted, with additional health patients for future pa-
tients being forgone [21]. For example, manufacturers may have
less incentive to invest in additional research once the product
is covered, physicians may consider further clinical trials to be
unnecessary and unethical, and patients may be unwilling to
participate if they already have access to the new technology. If
the benefits forgone for future patients exceed the benefits to
current patients of earlier access, then it may be better to with-
hold coverage of a technology, even if it is expected (on average)
to be valuable given existing evidence, until further research is
conducted [21]. In making this assessment, purchasers should
consider the value of evidence associated with research that
might be undertaken if coverage is withheld, how long such
research might take, and what other changes might occur dur-
ing that interval (e.g., the entry of cheaper generics or of other
new technologies). Such assessment will partly depend on the
price of the technology. For example, if the price of the technol-
ogy is reduced, then there will be greater benefits of early access
for current patients and if the technology was already expected
to be of value at the original price, the value of additional evi-
dence for future patients will tend to fall. Both these effects
would make immediate access more likely. Critically, there is an
important relationship between the price of a technology, its
value, and the need for additional evidence [17,21].
Costs of investment and reversal
The value of evidence that might be forgone as a result of early
coverage approval can be thought of as an investment (opportu-
nity) cost of approval. There are, however, other more familiar
investment costs such as capital expenditure on equipment and
facilities or staff training. There may also be some costs of with-
drawing access once a technology becomes widely used (e.g., the
time and effort required to change common clinical practice). In
such cases, uncertainty that, as further information emerges,
might lead to subsequent withdrawal of coverage of a technology
means that the decision should not be based on the expected NHB
alone. The source of uncertainty may be in the estimates of NHB,
which further research could partly resolve. There are, however,
other sources of uncertainty that cannot be reduced by further
research but that might, nonetheless, resolve over time (e.g., the
entry of generics at patent expiry). Even if further research is not
conducted, the existence of significant investment and reversal
costs (sometimes called irreversible costs) could mean that delay-
ing coverage until uncertainties are resolved or reduced might be
preferable even for technologies that are expected to be of value on
average on the basis of current evidence [22,23].
These concepts provide a set of guiding principles about the
type of assessments that need to be made by purchasing bodies,
whether or not they are informed by formal analysis. Of course, all
these issues are affected in different ways by the price of the tech-
nology, which should be considered jointly. The essential features
of the various schemes that have been proposed, and the choice
between them, rest on these trade-offs.
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Purchaser’s Range of Authority
Before assessing the coverage options available to the purchaser, it
is first worth considering the possible characteristics of the tech-
nology with regard to evidence and reversibility (henceforth re-
ferred to as the “technology characteristics”) and the purchaser’s
range of authority over access, research, and price (henceforth
referred to as the “range of authority”) to determine what options
can and should be considered by the purchaser.
Figure 1 represents a stylized view of the technology character-
istics regarding evidence and reversibility, encompassing six im-
portant scenarios (labeled A–F): whether an initial positive deci-
sion about purchasing the technology is likely to be too costly to
reverse if new evidence emerges suggesting it was incorrect,
whether future research would be worthwhile, and whether addi-
tional evidence could feasibly be generated following a decision to
cover the technology. Future research is potentially worthwhile if
the value of the uncertainty that could be reduced exceeds the
costs of the research (this is a necessary condition in our frame-
work for research being worthwhile). Whether the evidence could
be generated following coverage would depend on the source of
uncertainty. For example, this may not be possible if the uncer-
tainty relates to the relative effectiveness of a treatment for which
a randomized controlled trial may be the only suitable design to
minimize potential bias, but a randomized controlled trial may be
unable to recruit patients if the technology is already available to
patients.
Figure 2 represents the possible range of authority a purchaser
ay have. To simplify, we present six key situations (labeled 1–6)
ased on a binary view of three dimensions of the purchaser’s
uthority:
. Whether a purchaser can delay a decision or reverse it in the
future in the face of new information.
. Whether the purchaser has some influence over the effective
acquisition price paid for a technology, either through price
Yes
Can the evidence be 
generated following 
reimbursement?
Yes
No
Is more 
evidence 
worthwhile?
No
Fig. 1 – The technonegotiation or arrangements that reduce the effective price ewithout changing the formal list price. The ability to influ-
ence price could be dependent on many factors, although
here we assume for simplicity that the purchaser can influ-
ence price only if it can reject the technology on the grounds
of a lack of value, thereby giving the purchaser some bargain-
ing power.
. Whether the purchaser can contract for research or have some
control of research budgets so as to ensure the research is
conducted.
It should be clear that the wider the purchaser’s range of au-
hority, the more extensive the decision options available. Only six
ypes of purchasers are possible because the inability to delay a
ecision supersedes whether they are able to conduct research or
ot. If a purchaser is unable to delay a decision, then research can
ever be of value, because the decision cannot be changed in the
uture.
Currently, it may not be possible to provide international ex-
mples for all six levels of authority (this does not negate their
onceptual relevance or the possibility of examples emerging in
he future); however, some illustrative examples are possible. In
rinciple, most decision makers are able to review earlier deci-
ions if new evidence emerges but organizations such as the Scot-
ish Medicines Consortium and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advi-
ory Committee in Australia rarely, if ever, do so. These bodies also
ave no direct influence on price, and so can be characterized as
aving the range of authority marked “1” in Figure 2. The National
nstitute for Health and Clinical Excellence in the United Kingdom
nd the Dutch system probably most closely resemble purchaser
3” because they have the ability to delay and review decisions,
ave limited scope to ensure research is conducted, and have little
nfluence on price. Examples of purchaser “6” might include
rance, Taiwan, and Belgium because they have the ability to de-
ay or reconsider a decision, can ensure research is conducted, and
ave the power to decide the reimbursement price. Some of the
rovinces of Canada resemble purchaser “5” in that they have
eatures similar to those of purchase “6” but have no direct influ-
F
Yes
If the technology is introduced would 
there be a cost in reversing the decision 
at a later date?
No E
D
Yes
If the technology is introduced would 
there be a cost in reversing the decision 
at a later date?
No C
B
Yes
If the technology is introduced would 
there be a cost in reversing the decision 
at a later date?
No A
’s characteristics.nce on price.
ter’s
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The previous section has characterized each in terms of six possi-
ble states. Combining the technology characteristics and the pur-
chaser’s range of authority (A–F and 1–6, respectively) creates 36
possible combinations, out of which falls a set of feasible coverage
options that we consider in detail in Tables 1 and 2. These are as
follows:
1. Reject:The technology is not paid for on the grounds that it is not
considered of value. This may be able to be reversed at a later
date.
2. Accept: The technology is paid for on the basis that it is consid-
ered of value. This may be able to be reversed at a later date.
3. Influence over effective price: The purchaser has some influence
over the effective price paid for a technology. It is assumed that
influence will be possible only if the purchaser can reject the
coverage of the treatment; otherwise, it would have no bargain-
ing power to ensure a reduction in the effective price.
4. OIR: Coverage of a technology is available only to patients in-
volved in research. This option may involve the purchaser pay-
ing for the research, requiring some influence over research
decisions (i.e., being able to contract for the research to be con-
ducted). Alternatively, it may involve the purchaser rejecting
the technology and simply recommending research, with the
research being paid for by another party (e.g., the manufacturer
or another stakeholder), which would not require the purchaser
to be able to ensure the research was conducted.
5. OWR: A positive coverage decision is conditioned upon the col-
lection of additional evidence to support continued, expanded,
or withdrawal of coverage [24]. So, the technology is covered for
relevant patients, but further research is also required. This
research may be funded by the purchaser, the manufacturer, or
another stakeholder, but such a decision would require that the
Do they h
Yes
Can they 
ensure research
 is conducted?
Yes
No
Do they h
Can the decision 
make delay a 
decision or review it 
at a later date?
No
Do they h
Fig. 2 – The purchaspurchaser is able to enforce that the research is actually con-ducted, and so it will be treated here as an available option only
when the purchaser can ensure the research is conducted.
Table 1 shows the options from which the purchaser should
choose in each scenario when the technology is expected to be of
value on the basis of existing evidence. The options available
when the technology is not expected to be of value on the basis of
current evidence are shown in Table 2. How these choices should
be made with reference to the conceptual framework is described
with examples below. More detail is provided elsewhere [16].
Whatever the purchaser’s range of authority, when there is no
cost of reversal and collection of evidence is not worthwhile, then
the decision should be based solely on whether the treatment is
expected to be of value or not. Therefore, in column A of Table 1,
he treatment is universally accepted, while in column A of Table
2, the treatment is rejected unless the purchaser has influence
over the price and the price can be lowered sufficiently for the
treatment to be of expected value.
When a purchaser has no ability to delay or reconsider a deci-
sion (purchasers 1 and 2), the value of evidence and any reversal
costs can simply be ignored because the decision has to be made
immediately and cannot be changed in the future. Instead, the
purchaser must base the decision on whether the technology is
expected to be of value and should accept or reject it accordingly.
A reject decision could be turned to an accept decision if the pur-
chaser has influence over price (purchaser 2) and can reduce it to a
level where the technology is expected to be of value.
When the purchaser can delay or reconsider the decision but
not ensure research is conducted (purchasers 3 and 4), then, in
cases where gathering additional evidence is worthwhile, the pur-
chaser should decide whether the value of immediate acceptance
(the expected NHB as a result of patients receiving the treatment
during the period it would take to conduct the research) outweighs
the value of the evidence that will be forgone. Because they cannot
ensure the research is conducted, they cannot use an OWR deci-
6
ope to negoate on 
the eﬀecve price?
Yes
No 5
4
ope to negoate on 
the eﬀecve price?
Yes
No 3
2
Yes
ope to negoate on 
the eﬀecve price?
No 1
range of authority.ave sc
ave sc
ave scsion and, therefore, if they feel the value of evidence outweighs
Table 1 – Coverage options when the treatment is expected to be (i.e., on average) cost-effective given existing evidence.
E(NHB)0 Technology characteristics
A B C D E F
Range of authority No cost of reversal/
Evidence not
worthwhile
Cost of reversal/
Evidence not
worthwhile
No cost of reversal/
Evidence worthwhile/
Cannot get evidence
with approval
Cost of reversal/
Evidence worthwhile/
Cannot get evidence
with approval
No cost of reversal/
Evidence worthwhile/
Can get evidence
with approval
Cost of reversal/
Evidence worthwhile/
Can get evidence
with approval
1 Cannot delay/reconsider
No influence over
effective price
Cannot ensure research
is conducted
Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept
2 Cannot delay/reconsider
Influence over effective
price
Cannot ensure research
is conducted
Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept
3 Can delay/reconsider
No influence over
effective price
Cannot contract for
research
Accept Accept Accept
OIR
Accept
OIR
Accept
OIR
Accept
OIR
4 Can delay/reconsider
Influence over effective
price
Can ensure research is
conducted
Accept Accept
Price influence
Accept
Price influence
OIR
Accept
Price influence
OIR
Accept
Price influence
OIR
Accept
Price influence
OIR
5 Can delay/reconsider
No influence over
effective price
Can ensure research is
conducted
Accept Accept Accept
OIR
Accept
OIR
OWR OIR
OIR
6 Can delay/reconsider
Influence over effective
price
Can ensure research is
conducted
Accept Accept
Price influence
Accept
Price influence
OIR
Accept
Price influence
OIR
Price influence
OWR
Price influence
OIR
OWR
E(NHB), expected(net health benefit); OIR, only in research; OWR, only with research.
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Table 2 – Coverage options when the treatment is not expected to be (i.e., on average) cost-effective given existing evidence.
E(NHB)0 Technology characteristics
A B C D E F
Range of authority No cost of reversal/
Evidence not
worthwhile
Cost of reversal/
Evidence not
worthwhile
No cost of reversal/
Evidence worthwhile/
Cannot get evidence
with approval
Cost of reversal/
Evidence worthwhile/
Cannot get evidence
with approval
No cost of reversal/
Evidence worthwhile/
Can get evidence
with approval
Cost of reversal/
Evidence worthwhile/
Can get evidence
with approval
1 Cannot delay/reconsider
No influence over
effective price
Can ensure research is
conducted
Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject
2 Cannot delay/reconsider
Influence over effective
price
Can ensure research is
conducted
Reject
Price influence
Reject
Price influence
Reject
Price influence
Reject
Price influence
Reject
Price influence
Reject
Price influence
3 Can delay/reconsider
No influence over
effective price
Can ensure research is
conducted
Reject Reject Reject
OIR
Reject
OIR
Reject
OIR
Reject
OIR
4 Can delay/reconsider
Influence over effective
price
Can ensure research is
conducted
Reject
Price influence
Reject
Price influence
Reject
Price influence
OIR
Reject
Price influence
OIR
Reject
Price influence
OIR
Reject
Price influence
OIR
5 Can delay/reconsider
No influence over
effective price
Can ensure research is
conducted
Reject Reject Reject
OIR
Reject
OIR
Reject
OIR
Reject
OIR
6 Can delay/reconsider
Influence over effective
price
Can ensure research is
conducted
Reject
Price influence
Reject
Price influence
Reject
Price influence
OIR
Reject
Price influence
OIR
Reject
Price influence
OIR
OWR
Reject
Price influence
OIR
OWR
E(NHB), expected(net health benefit); OIR, only in research; OWR, only with research.
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576 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 7 0 – 5 7 9the value of immediate acceptance they must just recommend an
OIR decision. For such purchasers, costs of reversal can be ignored
because the evidence that would change the decision will not be
generated if the technology is accepted.
If a purchaser can ensure the research is conducted (pur-
chasers 5 and 6), it can also consider an OWR decision if the
research can be conducted following approval. In such cases,
there is no longer the trade-off over whether the value of im-
mediate acceptance outweighs the value of evidence that will
be forgone. If the technology also involves large reversal costs,
however, then these must be taken into account because the
research may show the technology no longer to be of value.
Such significant reversal costs might mean the difference be-
tween OIR and OWR decisions.
What assessments are needed when choosing between
coverage options?
The above analyses set out how purchasers should choose be-
tween the set of coverage options under various scenarios. There
are a number of general insights that come from these analyses.
When the purchaser is unable to delay a decision or to reconsider
it at a later date, its options are heavily limited: it should accept or
reject, and the coverage decision should be based solely on the
expected value of the treatment (whether assessed explicitly or
implicitly). For technologies that are expected not to be of value
given existing evidence, the purchaser is generally limited to
rejecting the technology or trying to ensure a reduction in the
price.
More interesting are the choices available when a technology is
expected to be of value given existing evidence. As the purchaser’s
range of authority expands so also does the coverage options
available, and the choice should be based on more than the ex-
pected value. When further research is worthwhile but cannot be
generated following a decision to pay for use, the value of the
evidence should be weighed against the expected benefits of im-
mediate coverage to patients. When there are large reversal costs,
the purchaser should weigh the expected benefits to patients
against the probability that the decision will be wrong and should
be changed with the reversal costs incurred. What should be ap-
parent is that the choice between coverage options always re-
volves around the trade-offs between the expected value of the
Outcome Non-outcome
Reducons in expected eﬀecve price
Paent level
Populaon 
level
Price 
change
Pric
volu
Expenditure 
cap
Money back 
guarantee
Condional 
treatment 
connuaon
Price 
linked to 
outcome
Paent level
Discounted 
treatment 
iniaon
Ulisaon 
cap
Fixed 
cost per 
paent
Fig. 3 – A new taxonotreatment given existing evidence, the amount of uncertainty (andhow much of it can be resolved through research), and the mag-
nitude of costs of reversing a decision.
A New Taxonomy of Coverage Options
A plethora of coverage options have developed, although, as yet,
there is no common terminology for those observed in practice. To
address this, a taxonomy of coverage options that attempts to
draw out the key features of observed coverage decisions on the
basis of the framework presented above is presented. As illus-
trated in Figure 3, decision options are split into two broad areas:
those associated with reductions in the effective price (i.e., in-
fluence over pricing decisions from the previous section) and
those associated with evidence generation (i.e., OIR or OWR de-
cisions from the previous section). Differences between the cov-
erage options are often a result of variation in how the alloca-
tion of risk between the manufacturer and the purchaser is
altered by the agreement. Carlson et al.’s [24] suggested taxon-
omy has influenced the approach here but differs because their
key distinction was between coverage options that are out-
come-based or non– outcome-based, rather than whether the
focus is on altering the expected price or reducing uncertainty
through research.
Options changing effective price
Figure 3 distinguishes reductions in effective price as being one of
two types: outcome-based and non–outcome-based.
Outcome-based coverage decisions
Outcome-based coverage decisions link the effective price paid for
a technology to some measure of clinical outcome and, therefore,
operate at the level of the individual patient (although these can be
aggregated and so operate at the population level). Three types of
outcome-based agreements can be distinguished:
1. Money-back guarantees: These involve a refund to the health
service if a patient does not achieve a specified target. These
schemes can be considered “risk shifts,” where the risk of a
patient not achieving the outcome, and therefore having a neg-
ative NHB if the list price was paid, is shifted from the purchaser
Evidence generaon
Only in 
research
Coverage with evidence 
development
Refund & 
bursement
Condional 
ﬂexible pricing 
agreement
Reimbursement 
only
Refund & 
reimbursement
Reimbursement 
only
Condional 
ﬂexible pricing 
agreement
of coverage options.reim
e 
me
myto the manufacturer. An example is the agreement between
22
2
577V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 7 0 – 5 7 9Park Davis and North Staffordshire Health Authority for the use
of atorvastatin in patients with high cholesterol [25].
. Conditional treatment continuation: This involves the health
system paying for the continued use of a technology only in
those patients who have achieved a target clinical effect [24]. An
example is that between Johnson and Johnson and UK’s NHS for
the use of bortezomib for multiple myeloma [26].
. Price linked to outcome schemes: These involve the price being
directly linked to a specified outcome for each patient. These
schemes share similarities with money-back guarantees, al-
though the risk is still shared because the better a patient’s
outcome the higher the price. No examples of such schemes
have been identified, perhaps because of their high manage-
ment costs or the possibility for gaming by either party to arti-
ficially raise or lower the price. With the advancement in health
care information systems, however, such schemes may be
feasible.
Non–outcome-based coverage decisions
With non–outcome-based coverage decisions, effective prices can
be determined at a patient or population level (i.e., across all pa-
tients).
1. Patient-level non– outcome-based coverage decisions have
different effective prices for a given technology for different
patients, but this is not achieved by linking prices to mea-
sures of outcome; rather, prices are linked to other factors
associated with treatment. Three types of such agreements
can be identified:
a Discounted treatment initiation schemes involve patients
receiving a technology for a price that is different from the
list price at the initiation of treatment. The price then
reverts to the list price if the patient remains on the treat-
ment after a set number of courses or period of time. For
example, the first cycle of sunitinib for the treatment of
renal cell carcinoma is provided free for all patients in the
NHS [27].
b Utilization caps, or individual volume agreements, involve
the cost of treatment of patients being reduced (often falling
to zero) following an agreed length of treatment if the pa-
tient is judged still to require further treatment. These ar-
rangements shift the risk of the health system incurring the
cost of the patient undergoing more treatments than a spec-
ified maximum from the payer to the manufacturer. For ex-
ample, Novartis’ agreement with the NHS for the use of
ranibizumab for the treatment of wet acute macular degen-
eration in the NHS [28].
c Fixed cost per patient involves a set price for an entire course
of treatment regardless of the number of treatments re-
ceived. This involves a risk share between the manufacturer
and the purchaser, with the purchaser paying more for pa-
tients who require very few treatments but less for those
who require many. In the United Kingdom, such a scheme
has been agreed for the use of gefitinib for the treatment of
non–small cell lung cancer [29].
. Population-level non– outcome-based coverage decisions are
characterized by the effective price being determined at the
level of the health care system rather than the individual
patient. Three forms of such decisions can be distinguished:
a Price changes involve the negotiation of a price per unit of
the technology between the manufacturer and the pur-
chaser that differs from the list price. Examples of such
agreements are limited, however, as a result of global refer-
ence pricing, where pricing of a drug in one country is linked
to the price in another. As a result of this, most such agree-
ments would not be published because the manufacturerwould fear price erosion of its technology in other markets
as well.
b Expenditure caps limit the total expenditure on a treatment
without limiting the total quantity of the treatment avail-
able. These effectively link the price directly to the quantity
used and involve a risk shift, with the manufacturer facing
the risk of treatment levels being above those consistent
with the expenditure cap. An example is the Australian au-
thorities agreeing to cover $100 million (Australian) a year of
the cost of etanercept for rheumatoid arthritis, with the
manufacturer meeting any further costs [30].
c Price volume agreements link the price paid per unit for a
health care technology to the total number of units pur-
chased. An example is nonlinear pricing schemes where the
price paid for a unit differs depending on the total number of
units purchased.
Evidence generation
Evidence generation schemes allow access to technologies while
also providing evidence to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the
value of the technologies. These schemes fall into one of two
groups: OIR, where the therapy is only paid for in patients involved
in the research, and OWR, where all patients are given access to
the technology but new evidence is also generated. These con-
cepts have been discussed earlier. An example of OIR is National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence’s recommendations
that many treatments be used only in the context of random-
ized trials (e.g., laparoscopic surgery for colorectal cancer). An
example of an OIR scheme is the Swedish agreement on the use
of rosuvastatin for high cholesterol, whereby the manufacturer
agreed to provide additional data on the use of the drug in clin-
ical practice and the long-term effects of the drug on morbidity
and mortality [31].
Discussion
The concepts described in this article are intended to provide a set
of guiding principles for purchasers when considering whether to
pay for new health care technologies. Even if these concepts are
not implemented using formal analysis, they should still be in the
forefront of the purchaser’s thoughts when making such deci-
sions. The greater the purchaser’s range of authority over access,
research, and price, the greater the coverage options available
and, therefore, the increased scope to optimize decisions. In many
countries, the range of authority described above is split between
several decision-making bodies, for example, with a purchaser
having control of payment for use decisions and another body
having control of research funding. However, these are intrin-
sically linked and both have real effects on health outcomes.
The separation of these areas of authority, or the failure of pur-
chasers and other decision makers to act together, may, there-
fore, result in inefficient decisions by limiting the coverage op-
tions available.
It should be noted that only that uncertainty that can be re-
duced through research has been considered here. As previously
mentioned, there are other sources of uncertainty that cannot be
resolved by further research but might be resolved over time (e.g.,
the future price of a technology or its comparators). In the pres-
ence of such uncertainty, it may be optimal to reject a technology
that is expected to be of value given existing evidence and to wait
until the uncertainty has been resolved.
A recent policy development in some jurisdictions has been
“value-based pricing.” For example, in the United Kingdom, the
government is intending to introduce a system whereby the price
the NHS pays for newly launched prescription pharmaceuticals is
determined on the basis of their value (i.e., cost-effectiveness) [32-
578 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 7 0 – 5 7 934]. An important issue that will have to be addressed in this
system is how, in the face of uncertain evidence at product
launch, the value of additional evidence and the impact of irre-
versible costs are to be reflected in the value-based price. The
framework suggested here would imply that in such circum-
stances, the value-based price would be lower than that sug-
gested simply by the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio based
on current evidence [35].
The taxonomy provided here aims to reflect the coverage deci-
sions internationally and allocate these in accordance with the
framework developed [16]. Given the size of the United States,
there have been surprisingly few examples so far of these new
coverage schemes in that country. This may be explained by the
unwillingness of the private sector in the United States to adopt
such schemes, particularly with regard to those involving evi-
dence generation, where the benefit is not fully internalized by
the purchaser as a result of the public good properties of infor-
mation [36].
Our taxonomy aims to assist the understanding of the coverage
decisions observed in practice. Another set of schemes that has
emerged is cost-sharing schemes whereby patients cover some or
all of the cost of treatments that are not deemed to meet accept-
able value for money standards [37,38]. These have not been dealt
with explicitly here because they involve more complex issues
around patient choices and preferences particularly when consid-
ered across different types of health systems.
The focus of this article is the “demand side” of the market for
medical technologies. There has been debate about whether the
assessment of value in the manner described here will ensure
dynamic efficiency, that is, provide incentives for manufacturers
to invest in the development of potentially valuable technologies
in the long term [17,39–43]. This article has not discussed these
issues in detail, not least because they need to be considered
alongside “supply-side” issues such as patent lengths and govern-
ment support for scientific infrastructure and industrial research
and development.
The framework has been developed around the concept of the
expected value of a new technology on the basis of existing evi-
dence. This is described principally in terms of cost-effectiveness
as defined by organizations such as the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence in the United Kingdom. It is recog-
nized that some jurisdictions do not use formal cost-effectiveness
analysis to support coverage decisions, but it can be argued that
such systems (e.g., Medicare in the United States and the French
health system) conduct an implicit comparison of the magnitude
of gain in effectiveness offered by a new technology, against rele-
vant comparators, and its acquisition cost. Any assessment of
value for money needs to consider which consequences of new
technologies are valued. Our framework simplifies this to a con-
cern only with aggregate health gain in a population. In reality,
other factors may be important to purchasers including a range of
equity considerations and the need to encourage innovation
among technology manufacturers. Although these wider consid-
erations complicate the technical implementation of cost-effec-
tiveness, the value of the conceptual framework remains in show-
ing the types of assessments purchasers need to make in selecting
appropriate coverage options.
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